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We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world.  We find that
almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. 
Government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media.  Government
ownership of the media is generally associated with less press freedom, fewer political and economic
rights, and, most conspicuously, inferior social outcomes in the areas of education and health.  It does not
appear that adverse consequences of government ownership of the media are restricted solely to the
instances of government monopoly.
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In modern economies and societies, the availability of information is central to better
decision making by citizens and consumers.  In political markets, citizens require information
about candidates to make intelligent voting choices.  In economic markets, including financial
markets, consumers and investors require information to select products and securities.  The
availability of information is a crucial determinant of the efficiency of political and economic
markets (Simons 1948, Stigler 1961, Stiglitz 2000).
In most countries, citizens and consumers receive the information they need through the
media, including newspapers, television, and radio. The media serve as the intermediaries that
collect information and make it available to citizens and consumers.  A crucial question, then, is
how the media should be optimally organized.  Should newspapers or television channels be state
or privately owned?  Should the media industry be organized as a monopoly, or competitively? 
While there is some theoretical discussion of these issues, our empirical knowledge of the possible
forms of organization of the media industry, and their consequences for economic and political
markets, remains extremely limited.
Consider some theoretical issues first.  A Pigouvian economist, who believes that
governments maximize the welfare of consumers, would conclude that information should be
provided by a government-owned monopoly.  First, information is a public good – once it is
supplied to some consumers, it is costly to keep it away from others, even if they had not paid for
it.  Second, the provision as well as dissemination of information is subject to strong increasing
returns: there are significant fixed costs of organizing information gathering and distribution
facilities, but once these costs are incurred, the marginal costs of making the information available
are relatively low.  For both of these independent reasons, a strong welfare-theoretic case for2
organizing the media as a government owned monopoly can be made.  Indeed, these arguments
were adduced by the management of the newly formed British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in
support of maintaining a publicly subsidized monopoly on radio and television in Britain (Coase
1950), and subsequently repeated in many developing countries.
In the case of the media industry, one additional argument animates the advocates of public
ownership, namely consumer ignorance.   In the extreme form, this argument holds that private
owners use the media to serve the governing classes (Lenin 1925).  In the more subtle version,
argued for many years by the BBC, state ownership protects the public from exposure to “extreme”
views.  In modern versions, state ownership of at least some media is supposed to expose the
public to information, such as culture, which might not be otherwise provided by privately owned
firms.  This “Sesame Street” argument, in addition to the standard industrial organization ones,
mediates in favor of state ownership of the media in the minds of many observers. 
In contrast, those who believe in less than fully benevolent government are led to a
different conclusion.  In their view, a government monopoly in the media would distort and
manipulate information to entrench the incumbent government, preclude voters and consumers
from making informed decisions, and ultimately undermine both democracy and markets.  Because
private and independent media supply alternative views to the public, they enable voters and
consumers to choose among political candidates, commodities, and securities – with less fear of
abuse by unscrupulous politicians, producers, and promoters (Sen 1984, 1999, Besley and Burgess
2000). Moreover, competition among media firms assures that voters and consumers obtain, on
average, unbiased and accurate information.  The role of such private and competitive media is
held to be so important for the checks-and-balances system of modern democracy, that they have
come to be called “the fourth estate.”  A cynical view of a government’s motives thus leads to a3
very different prescription for the optimal organization of the media than does the benign view.
Interestingly, even the Pigouvian economists, who adopt the perspective of a benevolent
government when considering other industries and advocate both heavy regulation and
nationalization, avoid this position with respect to the media (Henry Simons 1948, W. Arthur
Lewis 1955, Gunnar Myrdal 1953).  Coase (1974) points to this hypocrisy of Pigouvian
economists: in the very industry where the case for state ownership is theoretically attractive, they
shy away from taking this case seriously.  Thus, according to Coase: “It is hard to believe that the
general public is in a better position to evaluate competing views on economic and social policy
than to choose between different kinds of food (p. 389).” Nonetheless, the assumption of
benevolent government often stops at the doorstep of the media, perhaps because economists want
to protect their own right to supply information without being subject to regulation.
2 
These debates notwithstanding, there is precious little evidence on the organization of the
media industries in different countries and its consequences.  Our paper aims to fill this gap.   We
collect data on ownership patterns of media firms – newspapers, television, and radio – in 97
countries.  Our paper provides a first systematic look at the extent of state and private ownership
of media firms around the world, of the different kinds of private ownership, and of the prevalence
of monopoly across countries and segments of the media industry.  Our basic finding is that the
two dominant forms of ownership of media firms around the world is that by the state and by
concentrated private owners, i.e., controlling families.
Demsetz (1989) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) hypothesize that the “amenity potential”,
also known as “the private benefits of control” (Grossman and Hart 1988), arising from owning
media outlets is extremely high.  In other words, the non-financial benefits, such as fame and
                                                
2 Much of the available discussion deals with the traditional industrial organization aspects of the media industry, such
as product variety and market power, rather than on the broader social consequences of media ownership (Spence and4
influence, obtained by controlling a newspaper or a television station must be considerably higher
than those from controlling a firm of comparable size in, say, the bottling industry.  Economic
theory then predicts that private control of media firms should be highly concentrated: with no 
controllers to enjoy the amenity potential, widely held firms are not a stable institutional form.  Put
differently, the control of widely held firms with a high amenity potential is up-for-grabs (Bebchuk
1999).  Our findings are broadly consistent with these predictions.
Having established the importance of state ownership of the media, we ask first:  in which
countries is government ownership of the media higher?   We find that government ownership of
the media is higher in countries that are poorer, have more autocratic regimes, and higher overall
state ownership in the economy.  These results cast doubt on the proposition that state ownership
of the media serves benevolent ends.
We then consider the consequences of state ownership of the media, as measured by
freedom of the press, development of economic and political markets, and social outcomes.   To
this end, we run regressions of a variety of outcomes across countries on state ownership of the
media, holding constant the level of development, the degree of autocracy, and overall state
ownership of the economy.
We find pervasive evidence of “bad” outcomes associated with state ownership of the
media (especially the press), holding country characteristics constant.  The evidence is inconsistent
with the Pigouvian view of state ownership of the media.   Still, since we only have a cross-section
of countries, we cannot decisively interpret this evidence as causal, i.e., as showing that state
ownership of the media rather than some omitted country characteristic is responsible for the bad
outcomes.  We note, however, that the omitted characteristic must be quite closely related to the
inclination of the government to control information flows, since we are controlling for a number
                                                                                                                                                               
Owen 1977, Motta and Polo 1997).5
of dimensions of “badness” in the regressions.
In addition to discussing media ownership patterns and their consequences, we examine the
role of media monopolies.  Recall that Lenin and the founders of the BBC insisted on monopoly,
for reasons of technology and benevolent censorship.  But even ignoring this particular argument,
one can still wonder whether any government participation in the media is detrimental to freedom
or just the state monopoly.  Any government ownership may be bad because the government has
the power to advantage the media firms that it owns.  Alternatively, private competition may
assure that alternative views are supplied to voters and consumers, and prevent government firms
from distorting the information they supply too heavily.  Only the data can resolve which one of
these theoretically plausible views better describes reality.  
Section II describes our data on ownership of the media.  Section III examines the
economic and political determinants of media ownership.  Section IV then focuses on the
consequences of state media ownership for freedom of the press, the efficiency of economic and
political markets, and a range of social outcomes across countries.  Section V addresses the
question of whether the effects of government ownership stem from the very existence of such
ownership, or from government monopoly.  Section VI summarizes the findings and concludes.
II.  Ownership Data
This section focuses on patterns of ownership in the media industry.  Because ownership
bestows control (Grossman and Hart 1986), it shapes the information provided to voters and
consumers.  Ownership, of course, is not the only determinant of media content.  In many
countries, even with private ownership, the government regulates the media industry, provides
direct subsidies and advertising revenues to media outlets, restricts access to newsprint and6
information collection, and harasses journalists.  We discuss these modes of control as well.
Construction of the Database
We gather new data on media ownership in 97 countries.  We focus on newspapers and
television, since these are the primary sources of news on political, economic and social issues.
 Data on radio ownership are limited. Radio reaches a high proportion of the population,
even in the lowest income and literacy countries, but it largely delivers entertainment.  The radio
market is also highly regional, which precludes any single station from achieving a large market
share.  As a crude index, we gather ownership data on the top radio station as measured by peak
adult audience, and on an “all-news” radio station when one exists in a country.
Our selection of sample countries is driven by data availability.  First, we identify the
countries for which we have information on control variables.   Since we are interested in the
consequences of state ownership of the media, we need to make sure that our results are not driven
by differences in the levels of economic development, the level of political competition, or of
broad state intervention in the economy.  To this end, we control for general levels of state
ownership in the economy, a measure of autocracy, and GNP per capita.  We use the Fraser
Institute (2000) index of the involvement of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy, which
is based upon the number of SOEs, their prevalence in particular sectors of the economy, and their
share of gross domestic output. 
3   A total of 133 countries have the SOE index, GNP per capita,  
and autocracy data for 1999.  Of those, we exclude 5 observations because a) the country is in civil
war (Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone), or b) the entity cannot be classified as a
country (Hong Kong), or c) no daily newspapers exist (Belize, Tajikistan).  We also exclude 31
countries lacking sufficient data on media ownership.  The final sample of 97 countries includes7
21 in Africa, 9 in the Americas, 17 in Asia and the Pacific, 7 in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 16
in Central and Eastern Europe, 11 in Middle East and North Africa and 16 in Western Europe.
Within countries, we select media outlets on the basis of market share of the audience and
provision of local news content for the year 1999.  This approach focuses on who controls the
majority of information flows on domestic issues to citizens.   We exclude entertainment and sport
media, as well as foreign media outlets, if they do not provide local news content.  We include in
our sample the five largest daily newspapers, as measured by share in the total circulation of all
dailies, and the five largest television stations, as measured by share of viewing.
4  We consult three
primary data sources to selecting these outlets.  First, we use Zenith Media Market and Media Fact
Book 2000 publications, which are organized by region, including Western Europe, Central and
Eastern Europe, Asia Pacific, Middle East and Africa, and the Americas.  Zenith Media’s rankings
of newspapers are checked with the World Association of Newspapers (WAN) World Press
Trends 2000 report.  WAN data are also used as the source for total newspaper circulation, which
is not reported by Zenith Media.   Finally, we use the European Institute for the Media Media in
the CIS report as a primary source for countries in the former Soviet Union.  Alternative sources
are sought in two cases: when there is an inconsistency in data reported by primary sources, or
when none of the sources covers the country in question.  When this occurs, we use local media
survey firms, World Bank external affairs offices, U.S. Department of State information offices,
and direct contact with the media outlets.
                                                                                                                                                               
3 For 6 countries, we construct this index using World Bank’s (2000) data on state enterprises.
4 Following the World Association of Newspapers definition, newspapers are considered dailies if they are published at
least four times per week. In the initial phase of the data gathering (first 12 countries) we focused on the top 10 media
enterprises in the daily newspaper and television markets. We subsequently reduced the sample to five firms per media,
for two reasons.  First, the difference in market coverage from increasing the sample of companies from five to 10 was
marginal.  In the first 12 countries, the top five newspapers account for an average of 62.4% of total circulation, and the
top 10 for 74.1%.  The correlation between the two is 94.2%. For the sample as a whole, the top five newspapers account
for an average of 66.7% of total circulation. Television markets are even more concentrated – on average the top five firms
cover 89.5% of total viewing.  Second, 20 countries in our sample do not have more than five daily newspapers, and 428
Where possible, we rely on company annual reports and WorldScope database for
information on ownership of media firms.  Many of our sample companies are not covered by
WorldScope, and operate in countries with limited disclosure requirements.  Accordingly, we also
use business news reports in Lexis Nexis and the Financial Times databases, country specific
company handbooks, media surveys and internet information services (see Table 1 for a
description of the variables and the main data sources).  In all cases, we verify the ownership and
other information externally by contacting World Bank External Affairs offices, Embassies in
Washington DC, and regional or in-country media organizations. 
Ownership data are for December 1999 or the closest date for which reliable data was
available.  For the majority of firms in the sample, ownership structures are stable over time.  
Timing is a significant issue only in the transition economies, where many media enterprises have
been privatized or have increasing rates of foreign ownership.  For these countries, we strictly
enforce the December 1999 date of ownership information, even when we have more recent data. 
We follow La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) in identifying the ultimate
controlling shareholder of each media outlet.  We focus explicitly on voting rights as opposed to
cash flow rights ownership of firms.  For each firm, we identify the legal entities and families who
own significant voting stakes.
5  This provides us with the first level of ownership.  For each legal
entity, then, we identify its ownership structure by determining all significant vote holders  -- the
second level of ownership.  We continue to identify vote holders at each level of ownership until
we reach an entity for which it is not possible to break down the ownership structure any further.
The entity that ultimately controls the highest number of voting rights, but no less than
20% at every link of the chain, is defined as the ultimate owner.  Such control can be gained
                                                                                                                                                               
countries do not have more than five television stations.
5 The cut-off level of voting stakes depends on the mandatory disclosure levels in the country.  In no case, however, is9
through direct ownership of more than 20% of voting rights of a media enterprise, or indirectly
through a chain of intermediate owners.  For example, an individual X may control newspapers Z
when he holds over 20% of the voting rights in Company Y, which in turn owns over 20% of the
voting rights in Z.   With indirect holdings, we define the percentage of ultimate ownership as the
minimum holding along the chain of control. 
After identifying the ultimate owner, we classify each media outlet into one of the four
main categories of owners: the state, families,
6 widely held corporations, and “other.”  Examples
of other controlling entities are employee organizations, trade unions, political parties, the Church,
not-for-profit foundations, and business associations.  We define a corporation as widely held if
there is no owner with 20% or more of the voting rights.  We also keep track of whether the
ultimate owner is a foreign family, entity or government.
7
Examples of Media Ownership
The construction of the ownership variables is best illustrated through examples of
ownership structures of individual firms. We start with a simple case of family ownership.  In
Argentina, the third largest newspaper, with a daily circulation of 177,000, is La Nacion.  The
owner of each share in La Nacion is entitled to one vote.  There are two large shareholders in La
Nacion (Figure 1): the Saguier family, with 72% of capital and votes, and Grupo Mitre, with 28%
of capital and votes.  Grupo Mitre is in turn 100% owned by the Mitre family.  Although the Mitre
family holds an indirect control of 28% in La Nacion, we follow the chain of control of the largest
shareholder at each level of ownership.  We therefore record the Saguier family as the ultimate
                                                                                                                                                               
that threshold higher than 5%.
6 We use families as a unit of analysis and do not look within families.
7 In a few instances, the owner of voting rights in a media firm does not hold the broadcast license.  In these cases,
firm and not license ownership determines control.  We do this because control of all broadcast licenses ultimately10
owner, and classify La Nacion as family owned.
A more complex example of family ownership is the Norwegian television station TVN
(Figure 2).   TVN is the second largest television station with local content in Norway, as
measured by share of viewing.   It is 50.7% controlled by Scandinavian Broadcasting Systems
(SBS), and 49.3% by the largest Norwegian television station, TV2.  We follow the chain of
control along SBS rather than TV2, since SBS holds the majority of votes in TVN.  Although Mr
Sloan (the Chairman and CEO of SBS) holds a 9.8% share of voting rights in SBS, the only voting
interest above 20% is held by the Netherlands United Pan-Europe Communications (UPC), with
23.3% of the vote.  The majority shareholder of UPC is UnitedGlobal Com (51%).  UnitedGlobal
Com is in turn controlled by the Schneider family, through a combination of 3 direct interests
totaling 21.9%, as well as 50% control of a voting agreement with 69.2% control of votes.  We
classify TVN as family owned and the Schneider family as the ultimate owner.
State ownership takes different forms.   The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is
classified as state owned.  It is funded by government license fees and advertising.  The Board of
Governors is appointed by Royal Prerogative, in practice the Prime Minister, and is accountable to
the government.  The BBC Charter specifies a number of safeguards to ensure its independence
from government interference.  By comparison, the largest television station in Myanmar is
controlled directly by the Ministry of Information and Culture, and the second largest station is
controlled directly by the Myanmar Military.  In both cases the state retains full powers to manage
content and appoint and remove staff.   Similarly, in Turkmenistan, the state maintains direct
control over the press: President Niyazov is officially declared the founder and owner of all
newspapers in the country. 
In a number of cases, we need to distinguish between state and political party ownership.  
                                                                                                                                                               
belongs to the government, and licenses can be revoked depending on the strength of property rights in a country.11
In Kenya, the ruling party Kenyan African National Union (KANU) is the ultimate owner of the
daily newspaper Kenya Times, the country’s fourth largest daily.  Yet we do not classify Kenya
Times as state owned, because if there were a change of government the ownership would remain
with KANU.  In contrast, control of the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) would remain
with the state regardless of the political party in power, so we classify KBC as state owned. 
Ruling party ownership also occurs in Malaysia and Cote d’Ivoire.  We place these firms in the
‘other’ category, along with more clear-cut cases of media owned by opposition political parties.  
In several cases, family ownership is closely associated with the state.  In  Kazakhstan,
President Nazarbayev’s daughter and son-in-law between them control seven of the 12 media
outlets in our country sample.   In Saudi Arabia, members of the Royal Family are the ultimate
owners of two of the five most popular dailies.  In cases where there is a direct family relationship
between the ultimate owner and the head of state, and the governing system is a single party state,
we classify the media enterprise as state owned. 
Other associations between families and state are prevalent throughout our sample.  In
Ukraine, the Deputy Prime Minister holds over 30% of the top television station, while in Malawi
the owner of the Nation newspaper is the Minister of Agriculture and Vice-President of the ruling
UDF party.  Neither of these positions are head of state in single party governments and we
therefore classify both media outlets as family owned.  Other unofficial links to the state were
documented in country files, but did not influence our classification of ultimate ownership.  In
Russia, the close associations between the owner of one of the main TV stations, Mr Berezovsky,
and the then-President Yeltsin are well documented.
8  In Indonesia, the daughter of ex-President
Suharto still controls one of the main television stations.  In an effort to be conservative in our
                                                
8  Mr Berezovsky wrote that “…we helped Yeltsin defeat the Communists at the polls, using privately owned TV
stations.” Washington Post, Oct. 26, 2000, p. A27.12
measures of state control, in all these cases we classified the media outlets as family owned, since
a change in government would sever the link between the politician and the media owner.
Media regulations and ownership
Throughout the world, governments regulate media using measures ranging from content
restrictions in broadcasting licenses to Constitutional freedom of expression provisions.  The types
of regulations and their enforcement vary significantly within our sample countries.
In some cases, ownership is influenced directly by regulation.  In Norway, for example,
regulations restrict owners from holding more than one third of shares in media enterprises.  
Similar restrictions on ownership apply in Israel.  Regulations of foreign ownership and cross
media ownership are also prevalent.  Of the 49 countries surveyed by the World Association of
Newspapers, 14 have explicit restrictions on foreign ownership of newspapers.  In Brazil, for
example, foreign ownership of voting capital of media enterprises is prohibited, and foreign
participation in non-voting capital is limited to 30%.  Not surprisingly, foreign owners are absent
from the Brazilian sample.  A further 21 of WAN countries regulate cross media ownership.  In
Australia, proprietors of major metropolitan newspapers are not permitted to own controlling
interests in free-to-air television stations in the same market.  As a result, the ultimate owner of the
Nine Network television station, the Packer family, is limited to a 14.99% ownership stake in the
one of Australia’s leading publishers, John Fairfax Holdings.
Our data do not account for regulations that can substitute for state ownership as a means
to control content. Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) publishes all of the top 5 daily newspapers in
Singapore (Figure 3).   Shares of SPH are divided into two categories: ordinary shares, which carry
one share per vote, and management shares, which carry 200 votes per share.  The ownership13
structure of SPH is characterized by complex cross holdings, with three major groups of
shareholders evident in the data.  First, the Lee family controls a total of 47.23% of votes through
4 companies.  Second, the state holds a total of 27.23% of votes through various intermediary
institutions.  Third, there are a number of minority shareholdings held in nominee accounts at
widely held financial institutions.
9  Ownership of nominee accounts is not disclosed.  It is possible
that they are owned by families or the state, in which case our estimate of their control is
conservative.    We classify the Lee family as the ultimate owner of SPH.  Yet by law, the
government must approve the owners of management shares of SPH, and can require owners to
sell shares.   We say that SPH is family owned, and note that this is a conservative measure of the
true influence of the state over SPH.
We use similar approaches in other cases of structural government influence of media
firms. In Saudi Arabia, the government approves the appointment of editors-in-chief of
newspapers, and also has the right to dismiss them.  Although clearly this increases the influence
of the state on press content, we apply a conservative definition of state ownership and classify
these newspapers as family owned.  In Malaysia, newspapers are required to renew their licenses
annually. Editors of newspapers that publish critical views of government have been pressured to
resign.
10  In this environment, self-censorship becomes the norm.  In all these instances, we
nonetheless rely on ownership in constructing our measures, thus underestimating state influence.
State subsidies and state advertisement revenues enable governments to influence media
content.  Such subsidies are common in transition and African countries.  In Cameroon, for
                                                
9 In particular, Raffles Nominees Pre Ltd holds 7.74% in SPH, 10.11% in Overseas Union Bank Ltd, and 19.44% in
United Overseas Bank Ltd. GSBC Nominees Pte Ltd controls 3.98% of SPH, 5.88% of the Overseas-Chinese Banking
Corporation, 3.42% of Overseas Union Bank, and 4.31% of United Overseas Bank. Finally, Citibank Nominees Ltd
controls 1.63% of SPH, 3.82% of the Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation, 4.08% of Overseas Union Bank, and
2.77% of United Overseas Bank.
10 Report of United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and the Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, mission to Malaysia, 23 December 1998.14
example, the state refused to advertise in privately owned press after critical coverage of
government.  Defamation laws also influence content by repressing investigative journalism.
Direct regulations of content may interact with ownership.  The North Korean Constitution
states that the role of the press is to “serve the aims of strengthening the dictatorship of the
proletariat, bolstering the political unity and ideological conformity of the people and rallying
them solidly behind the Party and the Great Leader in the cause of revolution.”
11   In the
Netherlands, the content of public service programming must be at least 25% news, 20% culture,
and 5% education.  Italy requires that 50% of broadcasting be of European origin.  Because of
these extensive regulations, our ownership classification is a conservative estimate of the true
influence of the state over content.
Variable Construction
We construct two ownership variables from these data.  First, we compute the percentage
of firms in each category – state or private.  For example, two out of the top five newspaper
enterprises in the Philippines are classified as state owned, as are three out of the top five
television stations.  We record Philippine newspaper market ownership as 40% state owned when
measured by count, and television market ownership as 60% when measured by count.  Second,
we weight the ownership variable by market share.  In the Philippines, the two state owned
newspapers account for 22.2% and 21.3% of circulation for the top 5 newspapers respectively, so
the newspapers are 43.5% state owned when measured by market share.  In television, the three
state owned Philippine stations account for only 17.5% of the share of viewing for the top 5
television stations, so the television market is 17.5% state owned as measured by market share. 
The market share variables, while more precise as a metric of state control, have the15
disadvantage that, in the countries with regional newspapers, such as the United States, the market
share of any single firm is small.  As a consequence, the variables we define are not properly
compared to those in countries with national newspapers.  This criticism, of course, is less
compelling for television firms, which are typically national.   The regressions presented below use
market share variables, but our results are virtually identical using the counts.    
For the radio market, we create a dummy equal to 1 if the top radio station is state owned,
and 0 otherwise.
III.  Patterns in Media Ownership
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the ownership of newspaper and television
markets in 97 countries.   Countries are organized first by region and then sorted in alphabetical
order.  Several patterns emerge from the data.
Our first significant finding is that families and the state own the media throughout the
world (Figure 4).  In the sample of 97 countries, only 4% of media enterprises are widely held. 
Less than 2% have other ownership structures, and a mere 2% are employee owned.  On average,
family controlled newspapers account for 57% of the total, and family controlled television
stations for 34% of the total.   State ownership is also vast.  On average, the state controls
approximately 29% of newspapers and 60% of television stations.  The state owns a huge share –
72% - of the top radio stations.  Based on these findings, for the remaining analysis we classify
ownership into 3 categories: state, private (which is the sum of family, widely held and employee
categories), and other. 
The nearly total absence of firms with dispersed ownership in the media industry is
                                                                                                                                                               
11 1975, Article 53 Chapter 4 of the Constitution.16
extreme, even by comparison with the La Porta et al. (1999) finding of high levels of ownership
concentration in large firms around the world.   This result is consistent with the Demsetz (1989)
and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) insight that the large amenity potential of ownership media outlets
creates competitive pressures toward ownership concentration.  In a sense, both the governments
and the controlling private shareholders get the same benefit from controlling media outlets: the
ability to influence public opinion and the political process.
We say that the state has a monopoly in a media market if the share of state controlled
firms exceeds 75%.  As Table 2 shows, a total of 21 countries have government monopolies of
daily newspapers, and 43 countries have state monopolies of television stations with local news.
Table 2 also shows that families and the state control the media regardless of whether ownership is
measured by count or weighted by market share.
Television has significantly higher levels of state ownership than newspapers. 
12 To explain
this finding, a Pigouvian would focus on public goods, and note that television broadcasts are at
least in part non-excludable and non-rivalrous.  Television also has higher fixed costs than
publishing, and more significant economies of scale.   The private sector might then under-provide
broadcasting services, particularly in smaller markets serving remote areas, ethnic minorities or
students.  These theories are central to many of the laws on public broadcasters in Europe. 
Alternatively, from the political perspective, privately owned newspapers are easier to censor than
privately owned TV.  Because television can be broadcast live, control of content is more likely to
require ownership.  In this case, governments that want to censor news would own television.
13    
                                                
12 Only five countries (Ghana, Philippines, Uganda, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) have more state control of the top 5
newspapers than television stations.
13 A further argument is that the extent of required regulation of TV is higher because of difficulties in defining
property rights for broadcasting frequencies.  It may be optimal from an efficiency standpoint for the state to control
television stations directly, as opposed to regulating the sector and spending resources in monitoring compliance. 
These arguments have been disputed by Coase (1959) and others, who do not see any need for government ownership
and regulation arising from the peculiar technological features of broadcasting frequencies.17
The simple statistics presented so far raise many questions.  The evidence suggests that
there are large private benefits of media ownership. Throughout the world, media are controlled 
by parties likely to value these private benefits: the families and the state.  In particular, the extent
of state ownership of the media (particularly in TV and radio) is striking, suggesting that
governments extract value through control of information flows in the media.  We cannot as yet
tell from this evidence whether high government ownership derives from a benign attempt to cure
market failures and protect consumers, or from a less benign attempt to control the flows of
information.  In the subsequent analysis, we attempt to distinguish these two hypotheses.
Determinants of Media Ownership
In this section, we examine how ownership patterns are associated with different
characteristics of countries.  We examine very basic determinants of media ownership, such as
geography, the level of development, the government’s proclivity to intervene in the economy, and
political regime.  For all of these characteristics, it is hard to argue that causality runs from media
ownership to these very basic country characteristics rather than the other way around. 
Table 2 shows that the data exhibit distinct regional patterns.  State ownership of
newspapers and television is significantly higher in African and Middle East and North African
(MENA) countries.  On average, governments in Africa control of 61% of the top 5 daily
newspaper circulation and reach 85% of the audience for the top 5 television stations.  Two-thirds
of African countries have state monopolies on television broadcasting.  With the exception of
Israel, all MENA countries have a state monopoly over television broadcasting.  State ownership
of newspapers – which averages 50% share of circulation - is also high in MENA countries. 
By contrast, newspapers in Western Europe and the Americas are held predominately 18
privately.  In Western Europe none of the top five daily newspapers are owned by the state.  In the
Americas, the majority of the newspapers have been owned and managed by single families for
many decades.  State ownership of television is also overwhelmingly lower in the Americas than in
other regions.  None of the top 5 stations in Brazil, Mexico, Peru and the United States are state
owned; this occurs in only one other country (Turkey) in our sample.   In Western Europe, in
contrast, a substantial number of public broadcasters push the regional state ownership average to
48% by count and 55% by share.
Countries in the Asia-Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union
have ownership patterns closer to the sample mean. 
14
Poorer countries have higher state ownership of newspapers and television (Table 3a). 
State ownership is reported after dividing the sample into quartiles of GNP per capita in 1999. 
The average state ownership of newspapers (by share) falls sharply from 49.7% for the lowest
income quartile to 0.0% for the highest income quartile.  In television, the lowest income quartile
averages 78.0% state ownership (by share), compared with 52.7% for the highest income quartile. 
Countries with higher state ownership in the economy as a whole also have higher
ownership of the media (Table 3b).  Countries in the lowest quartile of SOE index, which reflects
high economy-wide state ownership, average 48.5% state newspaper ownership (by share) and
78.6% television ownership (by share).  In contrast, countries in the highest quartile of SOE index
(low economy-wide state ownership) average only 20.3% state ownership of newspapers (by
share) and 60.4% state ownership of television (by share).
15
                                                
14 Ownership within each of these regions varies dramatically. Indonesia and Thailand have low state ownership of
the media, compared with full state monopolies in North Korea and Myanmar. The predominantly privately owned
media in Estonia and Moldova contrasts with the full state control in Belarus and Turkmenistan.
15 We also considered how state ownership varies according to the origin of commercial law in a country.  Legal
origins are classified into 5 categories: English, French, German, Socialist, and Scandinavian.  Two countries (Iran and
Saudi Arabia) cannot be classified in any of these groups since they practice traditional Islamic law.  Legal origin has
been interpreted as a proxy for the strength of property rights and inclination of the government to intervene in an19
 Table 3c shows that autocratic governments are more likely to own media outlets.  The
relationship is monotonic over the autocracy quartiles. 
In Table 3d, we consider whether per capita income, autocracy, and the SOE index have
independent influences on state ownership of the media. Generally, all three variables have a
significant effect in a regression.  In the analysis of the consequences of state ownership of the
media, we accordingly control for per capital income, the SOE index, and the autocracy measure.  
Table 3e presents data on the incidence of state media monopolies – defined as a more than
75% market share – around the world (with the exception of Singapore there are no private media
monopolies in our sample).  Two interesting findings emerge from the table.  First, state monopoly
is considerably more common in the television than in the newspaper market.  Second, state
monopoly is largely a feature of poor countries – there are almost no incidents of state monopolies
of newspapers, and relatively few of television, in the upper two quartiles of income distribution. 
These data themselves do not distinguish among theories - a Pigouvian can easily explain why
television and low income levels call for state monopoly.
Still, the preliminary evidence presents considerable challenges to the benign (Pigouvian)
view of government ownership of the media.   The less developed, more interventionist, and more
autocratic countries are the ones with higher state ownership of the media.  The market failure
argument for state ownership suggests the opposite: the richer, more democratic countries should
cure market failures through state ownership.  In the following analysis, we pursue the same issue
by examining the consequences of state ownership of the media.
                                                                                                                                                               
economy (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999).  It could, therefore, be argued that legal origin influences the extent to which a
state chooses to control media.  We find that, in television, the average state ownership is remarkably similar across
legal origins.  State ownership of newspapers in countries of German and Scandinavian is significantly lower than
French and Socialist origin countries.  For every other combination, state ownership of television or newspapers does20
IV.   The Consequences of State Ownership of the Media
In this section, we consider some of the consequences of state ownership of the media for a
number of social indicators, such as freedom of the press, the functioning of political and
economic markets, and social outcomes such as infant mortality and education attainment.
In this analysis, it is important to us to be able – to the extent possible – to link the various
outcomes to the state ownership of the media, rather than other characteristics of the society.  We
have shown that poor countries, with interventionist and non-democratic governments exhibit
higher state ownership of the media.  Accordingly, we control for GNP per capita, an index of the
involvement of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy, and the autocracy score in all
regressions.   Such controls do not assure us an unambiguous causal interpretation of the
relationship between state ownership of the media and the various outcomes.   It is still possible
that state ownership of the media proxies for some unobserved aspect of “badness.”  However, if
state ownership helps predict bad outcomes holding constant our extensive controls, it must be
closely related to the omitted “badness.”  For example, the omitted characteristic of a country must
reflect the state’s interest in controlling the information flows, or something close to that.
For ease of interpretation, we have coded all the outcome variables, as well as the controls,
so that high is good.  Thus a high value of the corruption or infant mortality variable corresponds
to low corruption and low infant mortality, respectively.
Freedom of the Press
Perhaps the clearest way to compare alternative theories of state ownership of the media is
by focusing on freedom of the press.   After all, the main implication of the Pigouvian theories is
that greater government ownership should if anything lead to greater press freedom, as media
avoid being captured by individuals with extreme wealth or extreme views.
                                                                                                                                                               
not vary significantly according to legal origin.21
Table 4 presents the results from the regressions of  “objective” measures of media
freedom on state ownership of the media.  We measure media freedom by actual cases of
harassment of journalists and media outlets, compiled from Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF) 1999
reports on journalists jailed and media outlets closed by governments.  Another measure was
constructed from the reports by the Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ, 1997-1999) on actual
numbers of journalists jailed.    We also look at a measure of internet censorship.
Table 4 shows a negative impact of government ownership of the media on media freedom,
holding per capita income, interventionism, and autocracy constant, with just under half of the
coefficients being statistically significant.  Media tend to be more independent, and journalists
arrested and jailed less frequently, when media are privately owned.  A closer look at the data
reveals a complex picture.  Journalist harassment is high in Turkey, Kenya, and Nigeria, where the
media is predominately privately owned, perhaps because it substitutes for state control through
ownership.  But harassment is also high in some countries with high state ownership of the media,
such as Angola, Belarus, Iran and China.  Furthermore, some countries with state media
monopolies – such as North Korea and Laos - exhibit a ‘Castro effect’: state control is so powerful
that there is no need to further restrict freedom through journalist harassment.
16
Table 4 also establishes that countries with higher state media ownership censor the
internet more heavily, as measured by a dummy that equals to one if the government does not
monopolize internet access and content (as measured by CPJ reports).  This association can be
interpreted to mean that state ownership distorts information flows.
                                                
16 We have also measured freedom of the press using subjective indicators from van Belle (1997) and Freedom House
(2000).  The effects of state ownership on these measures of freedom were also negative, but in general insignificant.22
Political Markets
We examine the consequences of media ownership for two aspects of political
development. First, we consider the effect of media ownership on civil, political, and human rights
of a country’s citizens.  If information flows are essential for the exercise of citizens’ rights, and if
government ownership of the media influences information flows, we should see an association
between government ownership and the rights.  Second, information flows may facilitate public
oversight of government, and increase the accountability of politicians for bad conduct.  In this
case, government ownership of the media would reduce the effectiveness of the government and
increase corruption (Sen 1984, 1999, Besley and Burgess 2000, Stapenhurst 2000).  In this
analysis, we again control for per capita income, government ownership of SOEs, and autocracy.
The results are reported in Table 5.   Government ownership of the press typically has a
negative effect on citizens’ rights, government effectiveness, and corruption.  The effect of
government ownership of the press is in many instances statistically significant, that of
government ownership of television and radio generally is not.   These results are most naturally
consistent with the view government ownership of the press restricts information flows to the
public, diminishing the value of citizens rights and the effectiveness of government.
17
Studies of election coverage illustrate the effect of state ownership of the media on the
supply of political information.  In Ukraine, election monitors from the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe recorded significant biases in media coverage related to ownership. 
Although all major television stations devoted more time to the incumbent than the opposition
candidate, the state owned television was more unbalanced in coverage and biased in content
(despite legal requirements for the state owned media to provide balanced and neutral coverage). 
                                                
17 Our results are also unsurprising in a broader historical context.  Dictators from Napoleon, to Lenin, to Hitler, to
Marcos nationalized the press.  The small independent press, with its “xerox and cassette journalism,” helped23
Of its total first round election related coverage, the state owned UT1 devoted 51% to the
incumbent, and 75% of that coverage was positive.  Each of the 6 opposition candidates received
substantially less coverage (a maximum of 16.7%), and the vast majority of opposition coverage
was negative.  The television channel Inter displayed similar prejudice – 48.5% of coverage was
allocated to the incumbent and 73% of that coverage was favorable.  Although Inter is classified as
privately owned, it has strong informal links to the state because one of the three shareholders is
the First Deputy Speaker of Parliament.
18  The channel 1+1 is 51% privately and foreign owned,
with a 49% non-voting minority stake held by the State Property Company.  1+1 devoted 34% of
coverage to the incumbent, and 50% of that coverage was positive.  Finally, STB, which is
privately owned, was the least biased of the four stations.  STB dedicated 23% of their coverage to
the incumbent, with 40% of that coverage recorded as favorable.
Experience in several countries also highlights the importance of media ownership in
pressuring for better governance. In Mexico, privatization of broadcasting led to a dramatic
increase in the coverage of government corruption scandals (Simon, 1998).  Introduction of a new
privately owned media in Ghana led to greater coverage of government activities as well as more
criticism of government.  In Kenya, privatized press exposed a public corruption case while
government-owned press defended the accused government officials.
Our results are generally much stronger for the press than for television.  For the latter, the
effects of government ownership are generally insignificant.  One reason might be that private
press, which is more common, provides a check on state television, ensuring freer flows of
information than would occur if both were in state hands.  The data confirm that the outcomes are
worse when the state owns both newspapers and television than when it owns only one of them. 
                                                                                                                                                               
overthrow the Marcos regime in 1986 (Maslog 2000).
18 The shareholdings are approximately equally distributed - 33%; 33% and 34% - between three individuals, with the24
Economic System
The supply of information by the media can also improve the performance of the economic
system, in two ways.  The first is derivative of the improvements in political markets.   When
citizens are better informed, they may – through political action -- become more effective in
limiting the ability of the government to hurt them economically, by for example confiscating
property or over-regulating businesses.  Economic governance indicators, such as the security of
property rights from confiscation and intervention and the quality of regulation should therefore be
higher in countries where media function more effectively.  The second way in which media can
contribute to economic performance is by supplying information that improves markets.  One area
where this channel is clear is financial markets, which are especially information-sensitive.   A
better information flow to these markets can facilitate better pricing of securities, reveal the abuse
of power by corporate insiders, and thereby encourage financial development.
19  In this spirit, we
examine the relationship between patterns of media ownership and financial market indicators. 
In Table 6, we find that higher state ownership of the media is associated with weaker
security of property, as measured by Freedom House security of property rights index and the
ICRG measure of confiscation risk.  Countries with higher state ownership of the media also
exhibit lower quality of regulation, as measured by the World Bank.   The results are statistically
stronger for the press than for television and radio.
We consider two indicators of financial development.  The first is the number of
companies listed on the national stock market, a measure introduced by La Porta et al. (1997).  The
results show that countries with higher state ownership of newspapers have fewer firms per capita
                                                                                                                                                               
Deputy Speaker holding one of the 33% stakes.
19 At a conference in Neemrana, India, in 2000, Luigi Zingales has made this particular argument.25
listed on their national markets.  The second indicator is a measure of banking development from
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999).   Countries with higher state ownership of the
newspapers have less developed banking systems.  These results are suggestive of the possibility
that state control of information flow might be detrimental to the development of markets.
The results for both the security of property and measures of financial market development
again suggest that government ownership of the media hurts.  Taken together with our earlier
evidence on freedom of the press and political competition, this evidence is broadly supportive of
the view that governments own the media – especially the press -- not to improve the performance
of economic and political systems, but to improve their own chances to stay in power. 
Social Outcomes
Lenin asked a fundamental question: whom is the free press for?  Our analysis has focused
on political and economic freedom, but a Pigouvian could presumably argue that the true benefits
of state ownership of the press accrue to the disadvantaged members of society.   Freed from the
influence of the capitalist owners, state-controlled media can serve the social needs to the poor and
disadvantaged, and thereby improve social outcomes.   A skeptic would argue, in contrast, that the
government would use its ownership of the media to muzzle the press, and to prevent the
disadvantaged groups from having a mechanism for voicing their grievances.  Government
ownership should then be associated with inferior social outcomes.
The contrasting predictions of the two views can be evaluated empirically.  Table 7 reports
the relationships between state ownership of the media and education and health indicators,
holding constant per capita income, government ownership of firms, and autocracy.  In countries
with higher state ownership of the media, we observe inferior school attainment, enrollment and26
pupil to teacher ratios.  Health outcomes, such as life expectancy, infant mortality and malnutrition
are also worse in countries where the government owns more media outlets.  In addition, measures
of access to sanitation and responsiveness of the health system are significantly lower in countries
with more state-owned media.  Media ownership structures that are associated with better
economic and political variables are also beneficial for social outcomes – in fact the results for
social outcomes are generally stronger and hold for television as well as the press.   These findings
undermine Lenin’s objections to the effectiveness of private media.
Earlier studies reached a similar conclusion.  Schramm (1964) argued that media plays a
crucial role in national development.  Thomas et al. (1991) found that maternal access to the media
has a strong and positive effect on child health in Brazil.   Sen (1984, 1999) argued that the lack of
democracy, freedom of information, and an independent press contributed to almost 30 million
deaths during China’s Great Leap Forward between 1958 – 1961.  He contrasted this with India,
which has not experienced a major famine since independence, and has stronger democratic
processes and press freedom:  “The Government (of India) cannot afford to fail to take prompt
action when large scale starvation threatens.  Newspapers play an important part in this, in making
the facts known and forcing the challenge to be faced.”  Besley and Burgess (2000) test Sen’s
proposition empirically.  Using data across Indian states, they demonstrate that higher newspaper
circulation increases government responsiveness to natural shocks.   Stromberg (2000) finds strong
support for this hypothesis as well.  Rather than focus on media penetration, our study points to a
critical deterrent to the ability of the media to serve these social goals -- government ownership.
Robustness
We checked the robustness of our results in a number of ways.  Although we do not present27
these findings, we briefly summarize them.  Our results are robust to alternative methods of
controlling for the level of development, to inclusion of measures of media penetration (higher
penetration rates of media indicate more information flows to citizens), and to exclusion of
particular regions and small countries.  The results also hold when we divide the sample into rich
and poor countries (using median per capita income) and re-run the regressions for each sub-
sample. Furthermore, alternative definitions of dependent variables yield similar conclusions.
We have also examined the hypothesis that government ownership of the media has a more
adverse effect on outcomes in autocratic regimes, where other checks on the government are
absent.  To test this hypothesis, we included interaction terms of autocracy and media ownership in
the regressions.  The results confirm this hypothesis for economic and political development.
V.  Ownership or Monopoly?
The results of the previous sections raise an important question: are the adverse effects of
state ownership of the media driven solely by the instances of monopoly (or near-monopoly)? 
Alternatively, is more state ownership always worse, even at lower market shares?  At the time of
the creation of the BBC, the advocates of state ownership insisted on monopoly.  In recent years, a
softer argument prevailed, particularly in Western Europe, according to which some state
ownership – particularly of television – is sufficient to provide the public with exposure to
particular content that might be unavailable through private media.  Since there are no countries in
our sample with private monopolies of either newspapers or television, the monopoly question
pertains solely to state ownership. 
To address this argument, we divide our sample of countries into groups (of non-equal
sizes), by the degree of state control of newspaper circulation as well as that of the television28
audience.  Thus, we create dummies for state control of newspaper circulation being between 0
and 25%, 25% and 50%, 50% and 75%, and above 75%.  We create corresponding dummies for
state control of television audiences.  We refer to the countries with state control exceeding 75%
as having state monopolies in the relevant market.  We then rerun the regressions of Tables 4-7
with the dummies (for newspapers and television separately) rather than with the linear
specification of the effects of state ownership of the media.  The omitted dummy is always that
corresponding to the second quartile (i.e., state control between 25% and 50%).   We want to know
how the various outcomes compare across quartiles.
The results for media freedom, political, and economic markets do not indicate that the
adverse consequences of state ownership on the various outcomes are driven solely by state
monopolies.  In general, no clear pattern emerges from the data, as both third and fourth quartile
state ownership often has large negative effects.  However, most coefficients on quartile ownership
dummies are statistically insignificant.   For brevity, we do not present these results.
The results are clearer for social outcomes, as Table 8 shows.   Typically (though not
always), for both newspapers and television, the coefficients on the first quartile dummy are
positive, while those on the third and fourth quartile dummies are negative.  This evidence
suggests that social outcomes deteriorate over the whole range of increases in government
ownership of the media.  The more competition in the media, the better are the outcomes.  If the
adverse outcomes were driven solely by monopoly, we would have seen, in contrast, zero
coefficients on the first and third quartile dummies.  This said, we also note that – especially in the
case of television, the largest and most statistically significant adverse effects on social outcomes
appear in the cases of state monopolies.29
VI.   Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined ownership patterns of newspapers and television (and to a
lesser extent radio) in 97 countries around the world.  We have found that media firms nearly
universally have ownership structures with large controlling shareholders, and that these
shareholders are either families or governments.   This evidence is broadly consistent with the
ideas developed by Demsetz (1989) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that there is large amenity
potential (control benefits) associated with owning media – be it political influence or fame.
We then asked whether different patterns of media ownership are associated with different
economic, political, and social outcomes.  We found that countries with more prevalent state
ownership of the media have less free press, fewer political rights for citizens, inferior governance,
less developed markets, and strikingly inferior outcomes in the areas of education and health.  The
adverse effects of government ownership on political and economic freedom are stronger for
newspapers than for television.  Government media monopolies are associated with particularly
poor outcomes, especially when we focus on social outcomes, but we also saw some evidence that
various outcomes deteriorate more generally as state ownership increases.  Finally, there is no
detectable evidence of any benefits of higher state ownership of the media.  Although none of this
evidence can be unambiguously interpreted as causal, it obtains with extensive controls for the
level of economic development, state ownership in the economy, and the degree of autocracy.
At some broad level, these results will not surprise many readers, since intellectuals since
Milton in the 17
th century have advocated free press and independent media.  Nonetheless, we
believe this analysis makes two contributions.   At the theoretical level, it lends support for
Coase’s (1974) analysis of the media industry.  The theoretical arguments in favor of government
ownership of the media from the conventional perspective on industrial organization are very30
strong. Yet the data reject these Pigouvian arguments, and reveal no benefits of state ownership. 
In this regard, the paper adds to the growing literature pointing the severe limitations of the
welfarist approach to the analysis of state participation in the economy.  More often than not,
market failures pale by comparison with government failures. 
The paper also presents a range of evidence on the adverse consequences of state
ownership of the media, holding constant key country characteristics.  Government ownership of
the media is detrimental to economic, political, and – most strikingly  -- social outcomes.  The
latter finding is particularly important in light of a commonly made argument justifying state
ownership in a variety of sectors, including the media, by the appeal to the social needs of the
disadvantaged.  If correct, our findings thoroughly debunk this argument.  The evidence shows, to
the contrary, that increasing private ownership of the media – through privatization or the
encouragement of entry – can advance a variety of political and economic goals, and especially the
social needs of the poor. 31
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Variable name Description and source
State ownership, press 
(by count)
The percentage state-owned newspapers out of the five largest daily newspapers (by circulation), 1999.
State ownership, press 
(by share)
The market share of state-owned newspapers out of the aggregate market share of the five largest daily newspapers (by circulation), 
1999.
State ownership, TV 
(by count)
The percentage state-owned TV stations out of the five largest TV stations (by viewership), 1999.
State ownership, TV 
(by share)
The market share of state-owned TV stations out of the aggregate market share of the five largest TV stations (by viewership), 1999.
GNP per capita GNP per capita, 1999, in thousand US$.  Source: World Development Indicators 2000.
SOE Index An index from zero to ten based on the number, composition, and share of output supplied by State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and 
government investment as a share of total investment.  Countries with more SOEs and larger government investment received lower 
ratings. When there were few SOEs, and those are mainly in utility sectors, and government investment was less than 15 percent of total 
investment, countries were given a rating of 10. When there were few SOEs other than those involved in industries where economies of 
scale reduce the effectiveness of competition, e.g., power generation, and government investment was between 15 and 20 percent of the 
total, countries received a rating of 8. When there were, again, few SOEs other than those involved in utility industries and government 
investment was between 20 and 25 percent of the total, countries were rated at 7. When SOEs were dominant in utility sectors and 
government investment was 25 to 30 percent of the total, countries were assigned a rating of 6. When a substantial number of SOEs 
operated in many sectors, including manufacturing, and government investment was between 30 and 40 percent of the total, 
countries received a rating of 4. When a substantial number of SOEs operated in many sectors, and government investment was between 
40 and 50 percent of the total, countries were rated at 2. A zero rating was assigned to countries where over 50 percent of the economy's 
output was produced by SOEs and government investment exceeded 50 percent of the total. Source: Fraser Institute (2000) for 
all countries except Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ethiopia, Moldova, and Turkmenistan. Data for these 6 countries was constructed 
by the authors based on the World Bank's Enterprise Database (2000).
Autocracy Index of authoritarian regimes, 1999.  Based on an eleven point autocracy scale that is constructed additively from the codings of five 
component variables:  competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on chief executive, 
regulation of participation, and competitiveness of political participation. Values were recaled from 0 to 1 with 0 being high in 
autocracy and 1 being low in autocracy.  Source: Polity IV Project 2000.
Journalists Jailed (RSF) The number of journalists held in police custody for any length of time in 1999, rescaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating less 
opression.  Source: Reporters Sans Frontieres, 2000.
Media Outlets Closed The number of media outlets closed in 1999, rescaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating less opression.  Source: Reporters Sans 
Frontieres, 2000.
Journalists Jailed (CPJ) The number of journalists held in police custody for any length of time per year, average over 1997-1999, rescaled from 0 to 1, with 
higher values indicating less opression.  Source: The Committee to Protect Journalists, 2000.
Internet Freedom 0 if the state has a monopoly on internet service provision 1999, 1 otherwise.  Source: The Committee to Protect Journalists, 2000.
Political rights Index of political rights.  Higher ratings indicate countries that come closer to the "ideals suggested by the checklist questions of: (1) 
free and fair elections; (2) those elected rule; (3) there are competitive parties or other competitive political groupings; (4) the 
opposition has an important role and power; (5) the entities have self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy".  
Rescaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating better political rights.  Source: Freedom in the World 2000, Freedom House.
Civil liberties Index of civil rights.  Higher ratings indicate countries that enjoy "the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy 
apart from the state".  The basic components of the index are: (1) freedom of expression and belief; (2) association and organizational 
rights; (3) rule of law and human rights; (4) personal autonomy and economic rights.  Rescaled from 0 to 1, with higher values 




POLITICAL MARKETSTable 1:  Description of the Variables
Variable name Description and source
MEDIA OWNERSHIP Human rights A measure of 37 criteria (1990) based on the rights enumerated in the three major UN treaties: 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Eights, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.  
Ranges from 0 to 153, with higher scores indicating better human rights.  The three media freedom variables from the original index are 
purged from the data. Source: Humana (1992).
Government effectiveness A set of indicators combining "perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of 
civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's committment to 
policies".  Higher values indicate greater government effectiveness.  Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).
Corruption (ICRG) Assessment of the corruption in government.  Lower scores indicate "high government officials are likely to demand special payments" 
and "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and 
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans", 1997.  Scale of 0 to 6.  Source: Political Risk Services 
(2000) International Risk Guide.
Corruption (World Bank) An aggregated measure of "perceptions of corruption", whose components range from "the frequency of additional payments to get 
things done to the effects of corruption on the business environment". Higher values indicate less corruption. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).
Security of property A rating of property rights in each country in 1997, assessing the issue of "Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to 
establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized 
crime?".  Rescaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more secure property rights.  Source: Freedom House (1997).
Risk of confiscation Assessment of the legal security of private ownership rights, 1997.  Ranges frm 0 to 10, with higher values indicating lower risk.  
Source: Fraser Institute (2000).
Quality of regulation An aggregated measure focused on national regulatory policies.  "It includes measures of th eincidence of market-unfriendly policies 
such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas 
such as foreign trade and business development."  Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).
Number of listed firms The number of domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of 1999, scaled by population. 
This indicator does not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles.  Source: World 
Development Indicators 2000.
Bank assets Deposit money bank assets, scaled by central bank assets, 1997.  Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999).
School attainment A measure of the highest grade of primary education in which individuals are enrolled. The data reflect the attainment rates for the 
population that is over age 25, as of 1990.  Source: Barro and Lee (1996).
Enrollment Total enrollment at the primary educational level, regardless of age, divided by the population of the age group that typically 
corresponds to that level of education, as of 1995. The specification of age groups varies by country, based on different national 
systems of education and the duration of schooling at the primary level.  Source:  UNESCO Annual Statistical Yearbook 1999.
Pupil/teacher ratio The number of pupils enrolled in primary school divided by the number of primary school teachers (regardless of their teaching 
assignment), an average over 1990-1999.  Source: World Development Indicators 2000.
Life Expectancy Life expectancy at birth (years), average over 1995-2000.  Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
Infant mortality Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) in 1998.  Rescaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating lower mortality.  Source: 
UNDP Human Development Report (2000).
Nutrition Daily per capita supply of calories, 1997.  Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
Access to sanitation Percent of population with access to adequate sanitation, average over 1990-1999.  Source: World Development Indicators 2000.
Health System Responsiveness Responsiveness of the health system, both its level and distribution in 1999.  Higher values indicate greater responsiveness. Source: 
World Health Organization 2000.
ECONOMIC MARKETS
SOCIAL OUTCOMESState Private Other State Private Other State Private Other State Private Other
Angola 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Benin 0.20 0.60 0.20 0.31 0.50 0.19 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.71 0.29 0.00
Burundi 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Cameroon 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Chad 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Cote d'Ivoire 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.64 0.11 0.24 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Ethiopia 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Gabon 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Ghana 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.00
Kenya 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.88 0.12 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.45 0.55 0.00
Malawi 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Mali 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Niger 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Nigeria 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00
Senegal 0.33 0.67 0.00 0.51 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
South Africa 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.70 0.30 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.90 0.00 0.10
Tanzania 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.07 0.93 0.00
Togo 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Uganda 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.58 0.42 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.61 0.39 0.00
Zambia 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.74 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Zimbabwe 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Average - Africa 0.57 0.37 0.06 0.61 0.35 0.04 0.78 0.19 0.02 0.85 0.15 0.00
Argentina 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
Brazil 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.89 0.11
Canada 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.34 0.66 0.00
Chile 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.60 0.20 0.30 0.41 0.28
Colombia 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.27 0.73 0.00
Mexico 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Peru 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
United States 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Venezuela 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
Average - Americas 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.78 0.04 0.11 0.85 0.04
Australia 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00
China 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
India 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.88 0.12 0.00
Indonesia 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.85 0.15 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.23 0.77 0.00
Japan 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.39 0.61 0.00
Korea, Dem. Rep. 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Korea, Rep. 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.77 0.23 0.00
Lao PDR 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Malaysia 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.47 0.53 0.00
Myanmar 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.71 0.29 0.00
Pakistan 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Philippines 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.44 0.56 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.18 0.83 0.00
Singapore 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Sri Lanka 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.29 0.71 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.81 0.19 0.00
Taiwan, China 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.20
Thailand 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00
Average- Asia Pacific 0.28 0.68 0.04 0.28 0.69 0.03 0.65 0.34 0.01 0.70 0.30 0.00
Algeria 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.57 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Bahrain 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Egypt 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.94 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Israel 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.36 0.64 0.00
Jordan 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Kuwait 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Morocco 0.40 0.00 0.60 0.41 0.00 0.59 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Saudi Arabia 0.40 0.60 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Syrian Arab Republic 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Tunisia 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.23 0.50 0.27 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
 Average - Middle East 
North Africa (MENA)  0.44 0.45 0.11 0.50 0.41 0.09 0.93 0.07 0.00 0.94 0.06 0.00
TABLE 2:  OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION
Panel A: Top 5 Daily Newspapers and Top 5 Television Stations
Country
Press, by count Press, by share TV, by count TV, by shareState Private Other State Private Other State Private Other State Private Other
Armenia 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.53 0.47 0.00
Azerbaijan 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.31 0.69 0.00
Belarus 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Bulgaria 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.75 0.25 0.00
Croatia 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.33 0.38 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.97 0.03 0.00
Cyprus 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.89 0.11 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.23 0.77 0.00
Czech Republic 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.34 0.66 0.00
Estonia 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.29 0.71 0.00
Georgia 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.66 0.34 0.00
Hungary 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00
Kazakhstan 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Kyrgyz Republic 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.67 0.00 0.69 0.31 0.00
Lithuania 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.23 0.77 0.00
Moldova 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.12 0.88 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.44 0.56 0.00
Poland 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.57 0.43 0.00
Romania 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.37 0.63 0.00
Russian Federation 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.15 0.85 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.96 0.04 0.00
Slovak Republic 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.35 0.65 0.00
Slovenia 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.54 0.45 0.01
Turkey 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Turkmenistan 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Ukraine 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.15 0.77 0.07 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.14 0.86 0.00
Uzbekistan 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.73 0.27 0.00
 Average - Central/East. 
Europe and Transition  0.28 0.67 0.06 0.24 0.71 0.05 0.48 0.52 0.01 0.53 0.46 0.00
Austria 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.86 0.14 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.78 0.22 0.00
Belgium 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.41 0.59 0.00
Denmark 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.37 0.63 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00
Finland 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.48 0.52 0.00
France 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.43 0.57 0.00
Germany 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.61 0.39 0.00
Greece 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.68 0.32 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
Ireland 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.79 0.21 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.68 0.32 0.00
Italy 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.61 0.39 0.00
Netherlands 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.57 0.43 0.00
Norway 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.47 0.53 0.00
Portugal 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.38 0.62 0.00
Spain 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.43 0.57 0.00
Sweden 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.51 0.49 0.00
Switzerland 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.89 0.11 0.00
United Kingdom 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00
Average - West. Europe 0.00 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.91 0.09 0.48 0.52 0.00 0.55 0.45 0.00
Average - total sample 0.29 0.65 0.06 0.29 0.66 0.05 0.60 0.39 0.01 0.64 0.36 0.01





Africa vs. Asia Pacific 2.053
b 2.383
b 1.228 1.581
Africa vs. MENA 0.870 0.766 -1.323 -0.960

























Americas vs. West. Europe 0.000 0.000 -4.782
a -5.829
a
Asia Pacific vs. MENA -0.969 -1.290 -2.577
b -2.354
b
Asia Pacific vs. CEE/Transition  -0.036 0.222 1.889
c 1.632














CEE/Transition  vs. West. Europe 3.093
a 2.708
a -0.078 -0.126
a=Significant at 1% level; b=Significant at 5% level; c=Significant at 10% level.
TABLE 2: OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION (CONT'D)
Country
Press, by count Press, by share TV, by count TV, by share
Panel B:  Test of State Ownership Means by Region:  t-statistics






TV,       
 by share
1 (Low) 0.486 0.497 0.667 0.780
2 (Mid-low) 0.550 0.565 0.792 0.781
3 (Mid-high) 0.129 0.106 0.463 0.473







TV,       
 by share
1 (High) 0.488 0.485 0.768 0.786
2 (Mid-high) 0.444 0.459 0.702 0.786
3 (Mid-low) 0.339 0.338 0.622 0.672







TV,       
 by share
1 (High) 0.717 0.737 0.917 0.920
2 (Mid-high) 0.529 0.576 0.900 0.907
3 (Mid-low) 0.460 0.454 0.524 0.655





The first panel shows the average of state ownership of media by autocracy quartile. The second panel shows 
the results of tests of means across quartiles. 
 Means by autocracy quartile
Media owned by the state (by count and share)
Media owned by the state (by count and share)
Table 3c : State Ownership of Media and Autocracy
Means by SOE quartile
Table 3a : State Ownership of Media and GNP per Capita
The first panel shows the average of state ownership of media by GNP per capital quartile. The second panel 
shows the results of tests of means across quartiles. 
 Means by GNPPC quartile
Media owned by the state (by count and share)
GNPPC 
Quartile
Table 3b: State Ownership of Media and SOE Index
The first panel shows the average of state ownership of media by SOE index quartile. The second panel 
shows the results of tests of means across quartiles. Variable
GNP per 
capita










press (by share) (0.0027) (0.0112) (0.1462) (0.1075)






TV (by share) (0.0035) (0.0133) (0.0908) (0.0572)






radio (0.0061) (0.0185) (0.1037) (0.0593)







TV,       
 by share
1 (Low) 0.348 0.348 0.565 0.636
2 (Mid-low) 0.417 0.458 0.667 0.667
3 (Mid-high) 0.083 0.087 0.250 0.333
4 (High) 0.000 0.000 0.080 0.200
Quartile
1st vs. 2nd  -0.476 -0.760 -0.704 -0.211
































3rd vs. 4th  1.477 1.511 1.620 1.047
a=Significant at 1% level; b=Significant at 5% level; c=Significant at 10% level.
Table 3d: Determinants of State Ownership of the Media
GNPPC 
Quartile
state monopolies (by count and share)
 Test of means (t-statistics)
Table 3e : State Monopolies in the Media and GNP per Capita
The first panel shows the average of state monopolies of media by GNP per capital quartile. The second 
panel shows the results of tests of means across quartiles. 



















0.0013 0.0014 0.0412 0.9223
a 0.1650 97












(0.0241) (0.0009) (0.0047) (0.0663) (0.0788)
Media outlets closed -0.0514 0.0018 -0.0045 0.0599 0.9170
a
0.0771 97
(0.0547) (0.0018) (0.0060) (0.0559) (0.0567)





(0.0730) (0.0013) (0.0048) (0.0606) (0.0926)





































(0.1480) (0.0023) (0.0117) (0.1947) (0.1888)





(0.1215) (0.0030) (0.0119) (0.1912) (0.2081)





(0.0461) (0.0026) (0.0128) (0.1587) (0.1528)
Note:  1. All dependent variables are rescaled so that larger values correspond to better outcomes. 
2. Media freedom refers to press freedom index for newspapers and broadcast freedom index for TV and radio. 

















a -0.0511 0.8112 97




a -0.0816 0.8132 97











(0.0532) (0.0017) (0.0063) (0.0748) (0.0703)
-0.0804 0.0122
a 0.0006 0.5886
a 0.0608 0.7529 97
(0.0659) (0.0017) (0.0071) (0.0685) (0.0875)
0.0093 0.0118
a 0.0038 0.6441
a -0.0479 0.7497 97
(0.0394) (0.0018) (0.0069) (0.0597) (0.0590)














(3.9745) (0.1613) (0.7423) (8.3422) (7.5964)
































(0.2732) (0.0116) (0.0461) (0.4499) (0.4997)
Corruption -0.3152
c 0.0697
a 0.0372 0.2906 -0.6908
a 0.7609 95












(0.1370) (0.0070) (0.0259) (0.1627) (0.2077)
Note: 1. All dependent variables are rescaled so that larger values correspond to better outcomes. 














SOE index Autocracy Constant R
2 N

























(0.0418) (0.0018) (0.0090) (0.1107) (0.1091)























(0.4878) (0.0243) (0.1159) (1.2474) (1.2283)































(0.1002) (0.0047) (0.0207) (0.2361) (0.2448)







(0.0108) (0.0003) (0.0025) (0.0130) (0.0110)
-0.0151 0.0013
a
-0.0031 0.0156 0.0187 0.1319 97
(0.0118) (0.0003) (0.0026) (0.0137) (0.0124)
0.0070 0.0013
a
-0.0023 0.0275 -0.0081 0.1245 97


























(0.0723) (0.0028) (0.0151) (0.1596) (0.1654)
Note: 1. All dependent variables are rescaled so that larger values correspond to better outcomes. 















SOE index Autocracy Constant R
2 N
School attainment -12.4252
c -0.2927 0.6594 11.2771 31.1315
a 0.1791 67
(6.8314) (0.1882) (0.6836) (10.9235) (10.8036)
-18.6429
a -0.0990 0.2327 5.8109 44.3819
a 0.2221 67
(7.1035) (0.2068) (0.6922) (9.4805) (10.8167)
-9.7677
b -0.1789 0.4205 12.8217 33.2949
a 0.1815 67
(4.2261) (0.1862) (0.6466) (8.4014) (8.4477)
Enrollment -17.6477
b 0.1021 0.5956 -10.0709 106.0125
a 0.1137 92
(9.0161) (0.1762) (0.7532) (10.9333) (10.9157)
-15.5171
c 0.3166 0.5261 -7.6437 107.4779
a 0.1155 92
(9.4133) (0.1983) (0.7678) (10.8303) (12.8582)
-12.6303
a 0.2317 0.2066 -3.5497 105.1682
a 0.1265 92












(0.0651) (0.0019) (0.0077) (0.0758) (0.0834)
-0.0730
b 0.0094
a -0.0003 -0.0674 0.7619
a 0.2686 89
(0.0357) (0.0018) (0.0090) (0.0721) (0.0661)





(3.1662) (0.0694) (0.3664) (3.5440) (3.6037)
-10.8742
a 0.6196
a 0.2580 -4.9429 72.0350
a 0.4741 95
(3.3970) (0.0726) (0.3609) (3.8853) (4.7135)
-5.2631
a 0.5653
a 0.3021 -0.5103 65.6561
a 0.4350 95
(1.5117) (0.0753) (0.4020) (3.5597) (3.1979)
Infant mortality  -0.2692
a 0.0086
a 0.0007 -0.1184 0.9052
a 0.4142 95
(0.0833) (0.0015) (0.0082) (0.0891) (0.0944)
-0.2548
a 0.0122
a -0.0015 -0.0953 0.9514
a 0.4170 95
(0.0835) (0.0020) (0.0086) (0.0936) (0.1133)
-0.0985
a 0.0109 0.0010 0.0181 0.7705
a 0.3503 95
(0.0370)
a (0.0019) (0.0087) (0.0835) (0.0733)
Nutrition  -332.0943
b 26.9430
a 4.7406 -155.0844 2841.2880
a 0.4102 93
(159.8358) (4.8200) (16.2370) (205.9862) (214.3279)
-327.5296
b 30.8943
a 0.0288 -96.7649 2889.1050
a 0.4265 93
(167.5104) (4.5334) (17.5395) (197.5197) (254.9896)
-69.9647 29.3347
a 6.9868 74.0443 2584.5420
a 0.3968 93
(104.5659) (4.8416) (18.3053) (172.3610) (195.0220)
Access to sanitation  -0.3032
a 0.0137
a 0.0084 -0.0864 0.6954
a 0.4899 81
(0.0862) (0.0024) (0.0099) (0.1024) (0.1069)
-0.1879
b 0.0181
a 0.0079 -0.0185 0.6407
a 0.5051 81
(0.0866) (0.0024) (0.0104) (0.1249) (0.1347)
0.0017 0.0172
a 0.0142 0.0871 0.4175
a 0.4802 81
(0.0517) (0.0025) (0.0101) (0.1071) (0.1043)
Health system  -0.4595
a 0.0712
a 0.0365 -0.2186 5.1291
a 0.7780 96
responsiveness (0.1599) (0.0062) (0.0231) (0.1874) (0.1836)
-0.4607
b 0.0774
a 0.0323 -0.1848 5.2292
a 0.7899 96





(0.1272) (0.0064) (0.0244) (0.1690) (0.1967)
Note: 1. All dependent variables are rescaled so that larger values correspond to better outcomes. 
2. a Significant at 1%; b Significant at 5%; c Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses.Table 8:  Social Outcomes (ownership quartiles)
Variable Q1 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q3 Q4 GNP per capita SOE index Autocracy Constant R
2
N
School attainment 16.2055 16.5124 3.3544 -0.3526
c 0.8317 14.3843 12.2900 0.2237 67
(10.4101) (12.0328) (11.9074) (0.1908) (0.7237) (10.5532) (14.6843)
2.7149 -2.8935 -12.5599
a
-0.1292 0.2724 6.4016 37.9469
a
0.2291 67
(6.9479) (6.2498) (5.1926) (0.2301) (0.8235) (8.9221) (8.5661)
Enrollment 16.3807
c
0.2426 -0.9339 0.0181 0.6958 -10.2035 91.1163
a
0.1733 92
(8.8846) (11.4329) (10.3342) (0.1599) (0.7435) (10.4217) (10.0248)
2.8707 -6.0414 -7.2821 0.3126 0.7150 -4.4184 98.2317
a
0.1022 92
(4.6627) (3.7764) (6.2149) (0.2052) (0.8234) (10.6505) (9.4730)

















(0.0331) (0.0362) (0.0457) (0.0018) (0.0074) (0.0789) (0.0660)



















(2.2781) (2.4027) (2.3842) (0.0749) (0.3818) (3.9400) (3.7316)





















(116.2601) (156.3776) (150.7429) (4.9142) (16.3139) (210.0136) (193.2870)





(132.5104) (115.5565) (122.2571) (4.6147) (18.0633) (190.3904) (206.7376)







(0.0852) (0.0915) (0.0907) (0.0026) (0.0102) (0.1071) (0.0968)
81





(0.0702) (0.0844) (0.0700) (0.0026) (0.0109) (0.1324) (0.1221)















(0.1416) (0.1626) (0.1346) (0.0064) (0.0234) (0.1870) (0.1990)
Note:  1. All dependent variables are rescaled so that larger values correspond to better outcomes. 
2.: a Significant at 1%; b Significant at 5%; c Significant at 10%. Standard errors are in parentheses.
QI = state ownership of 0-25%; Q3 = state ownership of 50-75%; Q4 = state ownership of 75-100%
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%Figure 4: Newspaper and TV Ownership

































Press Ownership, by Share
State
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